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The study provides a comprehensive test of the relationships between dimensions of 
community representation within nonprofit organizations, focusing on Italian Bank 
Foundations where the community is considered the main stakeholder by law. In order to 
investigate what governance mechanisms increase substantive and symbolic representation, 
the study adjusts Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework by considering several formal 
mechanisms for appointing board members and the residence of board members as a new 
aspect of descriptive representation. Data collected through a content analysis and an e-mail 
survey show that formal mechanisms contribute to substantive representation, while 
descriptive and participatory arrangements enhance symbolic representation. In addition, this 
study explores the moderating influence of local stakeholders in appointing board members, 
offering a wider point of view on the relationships among the five dimensions of 
representation. 
 





More than two decades ago, Cnaan (1991) questioned the extent to which nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) rooted in the community were democratic, concluding that there was 
an evident discrepancy between their potential and actual level of democracy. That question 
is still central in nonprofit governance research because this discrepancy often continues to 
exist (Swindell, 2000), fostering a view of NPOs “not as public-spirited philanthropies but as 
self-serving entities that pursue the interests of their top officials and board members” 
(Weisbrod, 1997, p. 545). Although empirical studies are scarce, two streams of research 
have investigated the democracy of NPOs by considering, respectively, the participative and 
representative capacities of their boards (Guo, Metelsky, & Bradshaw, 2014). Scholars 
focusing on participatory democracy emphasized the importance of engaging the community 
in decision-making processes and making nonprofit boards more responsive to community 
needs (Brown, 2002; Checkoway & Zimmerman, 1992; Freiwirth, 2007; Harrison & Mort, 
1998; LeRoux, 2009; Saxton, 2005). As Cornforth (2004) noted, boards that incorporate 
stakeholders’ viewpoints are expected to respond better to broader social interests. Moreover, 
AccountAbility (2011) claimed that engaging stakeholders and being responsive to their 
concerns result in effective management and an increase in performance. The representative 
democracy stream of research focused on the process of selection of board members as 
decision-makers for the community (Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Iecovich, 2005; Kissane 
& Gingerich 2004). As noted by Pitkin (1967), representation is a controversial, vague, and 
multi-dimensional concept. Despite this, the more their boards are truly representative of the 
community, the better NPOs “might serve as training grounds for democracy” (Zimmermann, 
1994, p. 401). 
By considering participation and representation to be interconnected in the context of 




framework that bridges the above two streams of research, using five forms of representation: 
substantive, symbolic, formal, descriptive, and participatory. Answering Guo and Musso’s 
(2007) call for empirical research, our study tests their representational model focusing on 
Italian bank foundations (IBFs), a particular kind of grant-making NPO where the community 
is regarded as the main stakeholder by law. 
IBFs originated from the privatization of public savings banks, which were 
community-owned credit institutions with a strong vocation of solidarity toward the territory 
in which they operated. The so-called Amato Law of 1990 (Law no. 218 of July 30) separated 
philanthropic undertakings from lending activities, and created 88 community-owned IBFs 
(Jassaud, 2014). In light of their aims, IBFs must use the income derived from the 
management of their endowments exclusively for the development of the territories in which 
they are rooted (Anheier, 2001). Moreover, the law indicated that their main stakeholder is 
the community and established that their board of trustees must represent the community’s 
interests. We demonstrate how this different NPO context, where community representation 
is required by law, gives new insights regarding representational dimensions, mechanisms, 
and local stakeholders’ influence on governance. These insights could be helpful for 
nonprofit governing bodies and government authorities that aim to increase the 
representational legitimacy in NPOs, such as the recent example of the Spanish government 
(Law no. 26/2013) that defined the maximum limit of public sector representation (less than 
25%) in foundations’ boards. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, an overview of 
studies on community representation within nonprofit boards is used to develop our research 
question. Next, we explain our hypotheses drawing from prior literature and considering the 
specific characteristics of the IBF context for each dimension of representational legitimacy 




and list the variables on which the model is based. After presenting the main findings of the 
analyses undertaken, we discuss our findings and the study’s main contributions and 
limitations, and provide suggestions for further research. 
Conceptual Framework and Research Question 
While there is a general scholarly agreement that nonprofit boards should embody and 
represent community interests (Iecovich, 2005; Smith & Lipsky, 1993), little is known about 
the capacities of NPOs to effectively achieve this. Only a few studies have assessed NPOs’ 
representation abilities, providing mixed results (Brown, 2002; Guo & Musso, 2007; Guo & 
Zhang, 2013; LeRoux, 2009; Swindell, 2000). 
Most of the models presented to explain differences of representation in NPOs were 
based on Pitkin’s (1967) identification of four different dimensions of representation: 
substantive, symbolic, formal, and descriptive. Substantive representation means to “act for” 
others, and occurs when board members act in the interests of the represented community in a 
manner that is responsive to it through proper agendas, policies, and activities. Symbolic 
representation indicates the leadership’s ability to “stand for” the interests of the represented 
community, and occurs when the community and constituents trust an organization as their 
legitimate representative. Formal representation is based on formal mechanisms that 
establish the way board members are selected (e.g. elections) and stay in charge (e.g. rights of 
recall and term of office). Finally, descriptive representation occurs when “a representative 
body is distinguished by an accurate correspondence or resemblance to what it represents” 
(Pitkin, 1967, p. 60), and is concerned with a board whose members have socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics similar to those of the organization’s constituencies. 
Ragab, Blum, and Murphy (1981) considered formal, descriptive, and substantive 
representation, as well as actual representation, which is the time an organization devotes to 




the level of representativeness of NPOs: free open elections, members’ participation, 
informed membership, accountability to constituents, due process, level of similarity, 
similarity in perceived needs, cui bono, successful advocacy, and competition among NPOs. 
More recently, Guo and Musso (2007) presented a useful framework for analyzing 
varieties of representation in NPOs. They extended Pitkin’s (1967) conceptualization by 
adding a fifth dimension called participatory representation, which occurs when there is a 
direct and active involvement of community in organizational activities. This dimension of 
representation involves a set of different participatory mechanisms that vary along “a 
continuum with respect to the degree to which constituents and the community have the real 
power” to affect the organizational decision-making process (Guo & Musso, 2007, p. 315). 
Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework also highlights the relationships among the five 
representational dimensions. Substantive and symbolic representations are outcome measures 
of the organization’s “representational legitimacy” (Guo & Musso, 2007, p. 311), which 
occurs when it is engaged in external representational activities and the board acts or stands 
for the constituents’ interests. Conversely, formal, descriptive, and participatory 
representations are capacity measures of representational legitimacy, which contribute to 
achieve substantive and symbolic representation through a set of different representational 
mechanisms. Guo and Musso (2007) called for more in-depth studies to empirically test the 
framework and enrich the mechanisms and related measures in order to “clarify the extent to 
which different types of representational arrangements (e.g. formal, descriptive, participatory 
arrangements) seem to promote substantive and symbolic representation” (p. 323). 
Responding to their call, Guo and Zhang (2013) examined the relationships among the five 
representational dimensions within Chinese NPOs. They provided a validation of Guo and 
Musso’s (2007) framework and found evidence supporting a positive relationship between 




Despite the inclusiveness of Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework, the authors 
underlined that different contexts could provide different findings. Testing this framework 
with IBFs, in light of their community ownership, our study underlined how two adjustments 
of the model are required.  
As the first adjustment, we focus on the mechanisms for appointing board members. 
IBF statutes note three possible ways to choose board members, which can be mixed: direct 
designation by stakeholders, list of candidates proposed by stakeholders, and appointment by 
the expiring board of trustees. For the second adjustment, we consider the role of board 
members’ residences. The law (Legislative Decree no. 153/1999) deeply intervenes on 
representational arrangements in an attempt to improve the representational legitimacy of 
IBFs, requiring that at least half the board members have been residents in the same territory 
for at least three years. Consequently, we enrich Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework by 
shaping the descriptive representation dimension in two different items, which are considered 
separately: (1) demographic descriptive representation (DEM_DESCR), based on the 
commonality of socio-economic and demographic characteristics between community and 
board members; and (2) territorial descriptive representation (TERR_DESCR), based on the 
residence of board members within the territory in which the foundation operates. 
Moreover, Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework is enhanced by exploring the different 
weight of local stakeholders in appointing IBF board members, that is defined by law, 
requiring an equilibrium among them. As noted by Freeman and Reed (1983), stakeholders in 
a wide sense are “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives” (p. 91). In light of this definition, we consider local stakeholders as the groups of 
stakeholders operating in the same territory of the organization, which could influence or be 




deleted for revision] identified the following groups of local stakeholders with appointment 
powers: public sector organizations; cultural, educational, and research organizations; trade 
and professional associations; civil society organizations; expiring board of trustees; other 
residual stakeholders. These findings lead us to explore the influence of those groups in 
choosing board members as a potential moderator that could enhance or buffer the 
relationship between capacity and outcome measures of representation in IBFs. Figure 1 
depicts the adjustment of Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework in this study.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
By focusing on IBFs, our concern is to analyze if and how the adjusted capacity 
measures affect representational legitimacy. We thus formulate the following research 
question: When the community is on board by law, do governance mechanisms increase 
representational legitimacy? 
Hypotheses 
Considering the representational mechanisms studied in previous literature, we build 
our hypotheses. 
First, we investigate the relationship between formal representation and 
representational legitimacy. Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework states that formal 
representation contributes to NPOs achieving substantive and symbolic representation 
because the selected board members are expected to take care of the interests of the 
community who appointed them, and to respect its values and principles. Bramble (2000) 
observed that the degree to which leaders act in the interests of community members 
(substantive representation) depends on the existence of formal provisions that hold leaders 
accountable. Nevertheless, formal mechanisms do not necessarily lead to substantive 
representation. Similarly, Cnaan (1991) noted that formal arrangements are the hallmark of 




community who appointed them. However, he warned that formal mechanisms would not 
safeguard substantive representation if they do not function effectively. In this regard, Brown 
(2002) observed that the decline in the level of substantive representation within Australian 
unions depended on a decrease in the effectiveness of formal representation. Conversely, Guo 
and Zhang (2013) found that no correlation existed between formal representation and 
substantive and symbolic representation in the Chinese context because formal arrangements 
probably did not function effectively in the NPOs they studied. 
Formal mechanisms for appointing IBF board members (direct designation by 
stakeholders, list of candidates proposed by stakeholders, appointment by the expiring board 
of trustees) are required by law and regulated in detail within the statutes to ensure that the 
board acts in the community’s interests by promoting its socio-economic development. We 
thus expect that formal arrangements contribute to substantive representation. Since the law 
and statutes require board members’ integrity and good reputation as formal requisites for 
safeguarding the foundation’s image, we suppose that formal arrangements contribute also to 
symbolic representation. These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Formal representation (FOR_TOT) is positively associated with the level of 
substantive representation (SUB_TOT). 
H1b: Formal representation (FOR_TOT) is positively associated with the level of 
symbolic representation (SYM_TOT). 
The second relationship we investigate is between descriptive representation, and 
substantive and symbolic representations. Previous studies that focused on the relationship 
between descriptive and substantive representation provided mixed results. Ragab et al. 
(1981) found that, despite a great similarity with residents, neighborhood organizations’ 
leaders differ in perceiving the severity and urgency of neighborhood problems. It follows 




organization’s capacity to act in the community’s interests. Conversely, Cnaan (1991) 
observed that it is more likely that board members and constituencies share the same 
problems and seek common solutions when descriptive representation occurs. By reviewing 
the literature on democracy in neighborhood organizations, Cnaan (1991) found that leaders 
who “are not typically community members but the local elite” (p. 624) operate according to 
their own interests while neglecting residents’ concerns, thus confirming that the level of 
similarity between nonprofit officials and community members contributes to substantive 
representation. Guo and Zhang’s (2013) findings confirmed a strong correlation between 
descriptive and substantive representation. In addition, they highlighted that descriptive 
representation leads also to high levels of symbolic representation. By investigating the 
linkage between descriptive and symbolic representational dimensions, Abzug and 
Galaskiewicz (2001) found that community-dominated boards might be considered symbols 
of local identities because they “adopt customs, habits, ideologies, values, and beliefs of these 
groups as their own” (p. 53), thus performing an important role in legitimating NPOs. 
Kissane and Gingerich (2004) concluded that outsider nonprofit directors might limit the 
organization’s ability to establish trust in their communities. Similarly, Iecovich (2005) 
highlighted that a board that represents various constituencies with different interests and 
identities has a significant impact on its organization’s legitimacy, especially in terms of its 
worthiness. 
While previous studies investigated descriptive representation especially in terms of 
socio-economic and demographic commonalities between community and board members, 
territorial descriptive representation based on the residence of board members is found to 
have a pivotal role in ensuring that the IBF acts by knowing the territory’s interests. We thus 
expect that IBFs are better able to address the issues of most importance to the community if 




residents. Moreover, the origin of IBFs from public savings banks with the aim of promoting 
the territory’s social, cultural, and economic development led us to presume that IBFs might 
be regarded as a legitimate representative and symbol of local identities. We thus expect that 
board members, who mirror the community in terms of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics (demographic descriptive representation) and reside in the same geographical 
area (territorial descriptive representation), enhance the community’s trust in the 
organization. Based on these arguments, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H2a: Demographic descriptive representation (DEM_DESCR) is positively associated 
with the level of substantive representation (SUB_TOT). 
H2b: Demographic descriptive representation (DEM_DESCR) is positively associated 
with the level of symbolic representation (SYM_TOT). 
H3a: Territorial descriptive representation (TERR_DESCR) is positively associated with 
the level of substantive representation (SUB_TOT). 
H3b: Territorial descriptive representation (TERR_DESCR) is positively associated with 
the level of symbolic representation (SYM_TOT). 
The third relationship we investigate is between participatory representation, and 
substantive and symbolic representation. The findings from previous researches suggest that 
appropriated participatory mechanisms might affect an organization’s substantive 
representation. The studies reviewed by Cnaan (1991) demonstrated a trend of minimal 
resident participation in neighborhood organizations, because including residents in decision-
making processes was viewed “as costly and as an unwelcome and added burden” (p. 621). 
This low degree of participation diminished the organizations’ capacity to respond to the 
needs of the community. Similarly, Bramble (2000) noted that a low degree of participatory 
representation sets strict limits on substantive representation. He found that the most 




decline in the level of substantive representation. Swindell’s (2000) findings confirmed a 
positive correlation between the participatory and substantive representational dimensions.  
By examining the opportunity for residents to participate in decision-making, he 
concluded that organizations that allow residents to voice their concerns are better able to 
address the issues of most importance to the community. Brown (2002) noted that inclusive 
boards, which foster stakeholder engagement into decision-making processes, were more 
sensitive to community needs. Similarly, Saxton, Guo, and Brown (2007) recommended that 
organizations strive to implement more participative and inclusive practices for improving 
their representativeness and to ensure that “the issues of greatest importance to both the 
organization’s leadership and its core constituents are in conformity” (p. 149). Guo and 
Zhang (2013) confirmed the positive relationship between participatory and substantive 
representation. Their findings provided evidence that participatory representation in Chinese 
NPOs had a positive and significant impact on the levels of symbolic representation as well. 
They noted that the more constituents are directly involved in decision-making, the more they 
trust the organization as their legitimate representative. In light of these previous studies, we 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Participatory representation (PART_TOT) is positively associated with the level of 
substantive representation (SUB_TOT). 
H4b: Participatory representation (PART_TOT) is positively associated with the level of 
symbolic representation (SYM_TOT). 
Research Method and Measurement of Variables 
Data Collection 
The data collection was carried out in two ways. First, a content analysis on statutes 
of the 88 IBFs was conducted to investigate formal representation mechanisms for appointing 




(Krippendorff, 2012). Second, we collected data regarding the other representational 
dimensions through a survey based on a self-administration method to get the perceptions of 
respondents (Oppenheim, 2005). The initial research population we studied includes every 
bank foundation operating in Italy (88 IBFs) in 2014. Since Guo and Zhang (2013) call for 
multiple informant surveys to gain better insights on the relationships among the various 
representational dimensions, our units of analysis are people covering different roles within 
the foundations’ organizational structure. We submitted our survey to the presidents and top 
managers of the 88 IBFs, since they have an overall view of their organization’s governance 
and related features and activities (Smith, 1972). As a result, 176 potential respondents (88 
presidents and 88 top managers) composed our final data set. 
In the first phase of the survey, we pilot tested the questionnaire with 10 former 
members of IBFs (2 presidents, 8 top managers) to check the questionnaire’s readability and 
relevance. This allowed us to clarify (or delete) redundant items, making the questionnaire 
easily understandable by our target respondents. In the second phase, we sent an online 
questionnaire to our respondents by e-mail (Oppenheim, 2005) using addresses retrieved 
from the IBFs’ websites. In order to obtain a higher response rate, we solicited the responses 
by using telephone calls. We received 94 responses, with a redemption rate of 54%. 
Measures 
The current study investigates community representation within nonprofit boards by 
considering the representational capacity measures and the representational legitimacy 
measures of the organization. Four independent variables are used to measure 
representational capacity: formal representation, demographic descriptive representation, 
territorial descriptive representation, and participatory representation. The dependent 
variables measuring representational legitimacy are substantive and symbolic representation. 




members as a potential moderator in the relationship between capacity and outcome 
measures. Table 1 summarizes the variables and how they are measured. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Formal representation (FOR_TOT). Formal representation was assessed by 
analyzing the statutory provisions regarding formal arrangements for appointing board 
members. Previous literature (Guo & Zhang, 2013) usually focused on the election of board 
members and measured formal representation using a dummy variable that highlights the 
presence or the absence of that mechanism. Since IBFs do not hold elections, we considered 
three additional mechanisms under which the process of designation occurs. The analysis of 
statutes showed that foundations always formalize at least one of the following mechanisms: 
 Direct designation by stakeholders: Local stakeholders directly designate the members 
of the board of trustees; 
 List of candidates proposed by stakeholders: Local stakeholders propose a list of 
candidates, and the outgoing board of trustees chooses a member from each 
proposed shortlist; 
 Appointment by the board of trustees: The outgoing board of trustees co-opts the new 
members of the board. 
We treated each item as a distinct dummy variable that equals 1 when the statutes 
provide for the appointing mechanism specifically considered, 0 if otherwise. Since each 
foundation can simultaneously adopt different mechanisms for appointing board members, 
we measured formal representation by combining the three dummy variables in a structured 
categorical Likert scale variable (FOR_TOT), ranging from 1 (all members are appointed by 
the board of trustees) to 7 (all members are directly designated by stakeholders) (see 




board members. This power increases in presence of lists of candidates and direct 
appointment. 
Demographic descriptive representation (DEM_DESCR). Based on Guo and 
Zhang (2013), we asked participants about the board’s ability to reflect the socio-
demographic characteristics of the community (e.g. gender and age). Demographic 
descriptive representation was assessed asking by respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 (I strongly 
agree). 
Territorial descriptive representation (TERR_DESCR). We asked respondents 
how much they agree with the idea that resident board members reflect better the 
characteristics of the community that lives within the territory in which the foundation 
operates. Territorial descriptive representation was assessed by asking respondents to indicate 
their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 
(I strongly agree).  
Participatory representation (PART_TOT). We measured the participation of 
community members in decision-making using an existing scale (Guo & Zhang, 2013) 
consisting of seven items. Board members indicated their level of agreement on a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 (I strongly agree). A composite index 
was calculated using the average of the scores assigned to each value by the respondents. 
Substantive representation (SUB_TOT). Substantive representation is the first 
dependent variable of our model. Based on Guo and Zhang (2013), board members were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement on three items on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 (I strongly agree), relating to the organization’s ability to act 
in the community’s interests. As in PART_TOT, it was calculated by averaging the scores 




Symbolic representation (SYM_TOT). Symbolic representation is the second 
dependent variable of our model and was measured using an existing scale (Guo & Zhang, 
2013) that consisted of three items. Board members indicated their level of agreement on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 (I strongly agree). Again, an 
average score was determined. 
Stakeholder influence (Moderator effects). Stakeholder influence investigates the 
weight of stakeholders in appointing board members. The weights are drawn from [deleted 
for revision], who performed a content analysis of IBF’s statutes to measure the percentage of 
board members appointed by six categories of stakeholders. In our analysis, we consider as 
relevant public sector organizations, cultural, educational and research organizations, trade 
and professional associations, and civil society organizations. The two residual categories 
(board of trustees and ‘other’) are not significant in light of the low frequency revealed by the 
previous study. 
Method 
In order to assess reliability, we used two different methods. First, the internal 
consistencies were assessed. The normalized Cronbach’s alpha for the six items (FOR_TOT, 
DEM_DESCR, TERR_DESCR, PART_TOT, SUB_TOT, and SYM_TOT) was 0.894, much 
better than the minimum value of 0.7 suggested by Cortina (1993). Second, the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha for each of the six items was also examined, in order to check whether the 
exclusion of any item could improve the overall alpha value. We noted that none of them 
increased the Cronbach’s alpha value, so we maintained all the items presented in our model. 
The Explorative Factor Analysis was not done in light of previous results reached by Guo and 
Zhang (2013). We employed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, assuming that data 




variables: gender, age, and residence of board members, as well as board size. None of these 
factors was found to be relevant. 
Moreover, we included the moderator effect of the stakeholders’ influence that 
enhances or buffers the relationship between capacity and outcome measures of 
representation in IBFs. Specifically, we used a moderation called “two-way interaction” 
(Dawson, 2014, p. 3), because it is straightforward and accurate. Hence, moderation effects 
are typically discussed as an interaction between factors or variables, where the effects of one 
variable depend on levels of the other variable in analysis (Fairchild & MacKinnon, 2009). In 
re-elaborating Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, and Ellemers’ (2010) model, Hayes (2013) 
explained that “moderation analysis is used when one is interested in testing whether the 
magnitude of a variable’s effect on some outcome variable of interest depends on a third 
variable or set of variables” (p. 360). In other words, Moderator variables (Mn) affect the 
strength and/or direction of the relation between a predictor (Xn) and an outcome (Yn), 
enhancing, reducing, or changing the influence of the predictor (Aiken & West, 1991). In this 
case, the regression is between the single independent variables (Xn) multiplied by each 
single moderator (Public, Cultural, Trade, and Civil Soc.) and the dependent variable 
(Xn*Mn  Yn). In order to analyze the moderator effect, we adopted the Hayes (2013) 
model, where the bootstrapping method was applied on 5000 samples with a level of 
confidence for all confidence intervals (CI) in output of the 95%.  
Findings 
In order to better describe the results of our model presented in Figure 1, we divided 
our hypotheses into two categories based on the dependent variable (SUB_TOT and 
SYM_TOT). In the first category, we analyzed the relationship between the capacity 




category we considered the relationship between the capacity measures and symbolic 
representation. Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regressions. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Reconsidering our model in Figure 1, not all the hypotheses are significant. Hence, it 
was possible to redesign it in Figure 2 inserting only the relevant regressions (in bold). 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
As shown in Figure 2, there are only five significant regressions: two with the 
substantive representation (SUB_TOT) and the other three with the symbolic representation 
(SYM_TOT). 
We did not find a significant positive relation for H1b, H2a, and H4a, but the other 
five hypotheses (H1a, H2b, H3a, H3b, and H4b) were significant. However, H3a was 
negatively correlated, which means that territorial descriptive representation is negatively 
associated with the level of substantive representation. 
Focusing on these five significant regressions (H1a, H2b, H3a, H3b, and H4b), we 
analyzed the magnitude effect of the four moderators (INFL_PUBLIC, INFL_CULTURE, 
INFL_TRADE, and INFL_CIVIL) through Hayes’ (2013) model. In only two regressions, 
the moderation effect was significant. Table 3 shows the effect (enhancing, buffering, or not 
effect) of each moderator on the magnitude of the two relationships between TERR_DESCR, 
or PART_TOT (independent variables) and SYM_TOT (dependent variable). 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
According to Hayes (2013) and Dawson (2014), we divided the moderation effect into 
three influence levels (Low, Average and High effect) depending on the 95% of the 
confidence interval. Low influence indicates the magnitude effect of the moderator on the 
regression when its strength is low (CI 95% lower limit), whereas high influence of the 




is the point estimate, which means that the magnitude effect of the moderator on the 
regression is medium. Figure 3 summarizes the significant moderation effect (in bold) on the 
two regressions. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Exploring the relationships among representational legitimacy dimensions in the 
IBFs, we have provided adjustments of Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework. We enriched it 
by giving relevance to different mechanisms for designating board members and adding a 
new dimension of “territorial descriptive representation.” Using this adjusted model, our 
findings provide evidence that formal arrangements contribute to substantive representation, 
while descriptive and participatory arrangements enhance symbolic representation. In 
addition, we explored the influence of local stakeholders as a moderator in the relationship 
between various representational dimensions. 
Following Guo and Musso (2007), we found that formal representation is positively 
associated with the level of substantive representation (see Table 2). Formal representation, 
redefined to consider different combinations among three mechanisms of appointment, shows 
that, when board members are directly designated by stakeholders, the board of trustees acts 
properly in the community’s interests. This emphasizes the importance of formal governance 
arrangements in achieving substantive representation (Bramble, 2000; Brown, 2002; Cnaan, 
1991), which in our case was in great part provided by the Italian Government. In addition, it 
also suggests that mechanisms of direct designation lead to the selection of board members 
with a higher awareness of the needs to be met than in other mechanisms of appointment, 
such as list of candidates or cooptation by the outgoing board. 
In accordance with Guo and Zhang (2013), the study found no significant correlation 




not a lever, that could be useful for gaining the community’s trust and confidence in the 
organization, even when the law requires integrity and reputation of the appointed board 
members. These findings highlight that when the nonprofits search for increasing trust and 
legitimacy, they need to implement governance mechanisms of descriptive and participatory 
representation. 
Following Guo and Musso (2007), we found that demographic descriptive 
representation is positively associated with the level of symbolic representation. The 
commonality of socio-economic and demographic characteristics between community and 
board members enhances the community’s trust in the foundation’s ability to represent its 
interests. This confirms the idea that community-dominated boards are considered symbols of 
local identities (Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001). Despite previous evidence (Guo & Musso, 
2007; Guo & Zhang, 2013), the IBF experience shows that demographic descriptive 
representation does not have a role in promoting substantive representation. Our findings 
suggest that the commonality of demographic characteristics between community and board 
members enhances the foundation’s ability to “stand for” the community’s interests but does 
not necessarily improve its ability to “act for” pursuing them. 
Thanks to our second adjustment of including territorial descriptive representation in 
the model, we found that the residence of board members plays a pivotal role in increasing 
representational legitimacy. The results confirm that territorial descriptive representation is 
significantly associated with both substantive and symbolic representation. This means that 
the residence of board members within the territory in which the foundation operates plays a 
role in determining the ability to “act for” and “stand for” the interests of the community. 
However, the territorial descriptive representation has a negative influence on substantive 
representation. We conclude that the law provision, which requires that at least half of the 




foundations to act in their communities’ interests. These findings suggest a risk that resident 
board members could be a vehicle of individual interests. Conversely, territorial descriptive 
representation feeds the community’s trust in the foundation in an extremely significant way. 
Findings from the regression provide mixed results concerning the relationship 
between participatory representation and representational legitimacy measures. According to 
prior literature (Guo & Musso, 2007; Guo & Zhang, 2013; Harrison & Mort, 1998), 
participatory mechanisms influence symbolic representation in IBFs, confirming that the 
more the community is directly involved in decision-making, the more it trusts the 
organization as its legitimate representative. However, the results show that participatory 
representation does not influence substantive representation. Community involvement in the 
decision-making processes does not seem to be significant for increasing the coherence 
between community needs and the actions developed by the organization (Guo & Marietta, 
forthcoming). This suggests that the law provisions regarding formal arrangements prove to 
be sufficient for ensuring that board members are sensitive to community needs and act to 
meet them, while a high level of participatory representation improves only the community’s 
trust in the board. 
Enriching Guo and Musso’s (2007) framework by exploring the influence of local 
stakeholders in appointing board members, we found that the percentage of members 
appointed by each local stakeholder plays a significant role as a moderator in reinforcing or 
hampering the positive relationship between territorial descriptive and participatory 
mechanisms on one hand, and symbolic representation on the other. The influence is different 
among the four stakeholder groups that we considered. Focusing on the linkage between 
territorial descriptive and symbolic representation, we can observe that when public sector 
organizations appoint board members the influence is positive (see Table 3, first row). The 




consider the weight of culture, education, and research organizations, the influence is 
negative if this group appoints few board members and positive when the group has the 
faculty of appointing the majority of them (see Table 3, second row). As indicated in Table 3, 
cultural, educational, and research organizations are the organizations whose increasing 
participation in appointing board members could enhance the already significant relationship 
between the residence of board members and the trust in the NPO. Conversely, the influence 
of trade shows a buffering impact (see Table 3, third row), particularly when trade and 
professional organizations appoint a relevant number of board members. 
By considering the general effect of moderators (first part of Table 3) on the 
relationship between territorial descriptive representation (TERR_DESCR) and symbolic 
representation (SYM_TOT), the findings suggest us to decrease the number of members 
appointed by the public sector and to increase the influence of cultural organizations. The 
results of the analysis reinforce our belief that the presence of resident board members 
appointed by public sector as well as cultural and civil society organizations enhances the 
trust in the foundations, because these groups of stakeholders are closer to the actual 
problems of the community. 
By analyzing the relationship between participatory (PART_TOT) and symbolic 
representation (SYM_TOT) in the second part of Table 3, the results show that when the 
percentage of members appointed by public sector organizations is high, the moderator’s 
influence becomes negative and buffers the positive relationship between participatory and 
symbolic representation. In addition, the findings suggest that when civil society 
organizations appoint few board members, the trust derived from participatory mechanisms 
decreases. Conversely, the increasing magnitude of civil society organizations in appointing 
board members enhances the positive effect of inclusive participatory arrangements on the 




suggests also that the effect of trade and professional associations remains always negative, 
while the role of cultural associations is not relevant in enhancing trust through participatory 
mechanisms. The findings warned that a high percentage of board members appointed by 
public sector organizations or by trade and professional associations buffers the role of 
participatory practices in gaining symbolic representation. This means that, when the 
majority of members are linked with the public sector, the community perceives an increasing 
participation in decision-making processes as negative. This is a consequence of the 
community’s concern that the inefficiencies and delays of Italian public sector (Borgonovi, 
Fattore, & Longo, 2009) contaminate the foundation’s decisional processes. These findings 
are supported by the recent experience of Spain where the government by law (Law no. 
26/2013) limits the presence of public representatives. 
It must be noted that trade and professional associations always have a negative 
impact on the relations between territorial descriptive and symbolic representation, on one 
hand, and between participatory and symbolic representation, on the other. This could be 
justified by considering that this group of stakeholders represents prevalently economic and 
not social interests. On the contrary, our findings reveal that cultural and civil organizations 
have a potential positive influence in raising the symbolic representation. This stakeholder 
group is naturally linked with the social needs of the local community.  
In conclusion, by testing the representational model of Guo and Musso (2007), this 
study enhances the knowledge of which governance mechanisms could increase substantive 
and symbolic representation when the community is on board by law. In this way, within the 
law’s reference frame, the self-regulation activity could shape the better mix of governance 
arrangements. 
Three relevant insights for increasing the representational legitimacy of NPOs emerge 




board members, the study traces different scenarios resulting in different mixes of 
designation mechanisms that impact the representational legitimacy of the organization, and 
specifically substantive representation. Enhancing the number of board members directly 
designated by local stakeholders or selected within lists proposed by them contributes to 
increase substantive representation. No other governance mechanism beyond formal 
representation seems to affect the ability of the organization to act for the interests of the 
community. 
When the community is on board by law, measuring demographic and territorial 
descriptive representation separately offers a second insight. The residence of board members 
plays a pivotal and controversial role in explaining representational legitimacy. On one hand 
it increases symbolic representation, helping the organization to be trusted as a symbol of 
local identities, while on the other hand it decreases substantive representation and the 
organization’s ability to “act for” the community. 
Third, the weight of different local stakeholders in appointing board members 
contributes to the impact of territorial descriptive and participatory representation on 
representational legitimacy. The Italian experience highlights that when the community is on 
board by law it is necessary for each NPO’s statute to seek a balance among local 
stakeholders. The findings suggest that the balance could be obtained by decreasing the 
number of board members appointed by public sector organizations and trade and 
professional associations, and increasing the percentage of members appointed by cultural 
and civil organizations. This could be a useful insight for government authorities and 
nonprofit governing bodies for drawing governance mechanisms able to improve 
representational legitimacy in NPOs. 
There are some limitations of this study. Our research is based on data collected 




carried out in further researches may give us new insights that better explain both the 
negative relationship between territorial descriptive representation and substantive 
representation, and the effects of moderators on the levels of representation. Although we 
submitted our survey to presidents and top managers, multiple informant surveys could help 
to gain additional insights on what governance arrangements would increase representational 
legitimacy. Specifically, future research should collect data on the executives and on local 
stakeholder groups called to appoint board members. 
The path is open to new research studies that explore governance mechanisms through 
the lens of representation. This research is a step forward on this path, giving new insights on 
representational legitimacy mechanisms and underlining the pivotal influence that 
stakeholders appointing board members have in achieving legitimacy in both a substantive 






FOR_TOT as structured categorical Likert-scale variable 
Direct designation 
by stakeholders 
List of candidates 
proposed by 
stakeholders 
Appointment by the 
board of trustees 
Likert Scale 
Value 
1 0 0 7 
1 1 0 6 
0 1 0 5 
1 0 1 4 
1 1 1 3 
0 1 1 2 
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Description and Measurement of Variables 




Mechanisms for board member 
selection. 
Likert scale from 1 
to 7 






Board members have socio-
economic and demographic 
characteristics similar to those of 
the organizational 
constituencies. 
Likert scale from1 
to 5 






Board members reside in the 
same territory in which the 
organization operates. 
Likert scale from 1 
to 5 





Direct and active involvement of 
community in organizational 
activities. 
Likert scale from 1 
to 5 





Board members act in the 
interests of the represented 
community. 
Likert scale from 1 
to 5 





The community trusts an 
organization as its legitimate 
representative. 
Likert scale from 1 
to 5 




Weight in appointing board 
members, referring to four 
groups of local stakeholders: 
1. Public sector 
(INFL_PUBLIC) 
2. Culture education and 
research (INFL_CULTURE) 
3. Trade and professional 
associations 
(INFL_TRADE) 
4. Civil society organizations 
(INFL_CIVIL) 
Percentage 









Results of the OLS Regressions 
Regression R2 β Sign. Accepted / Not Accepted 
FOR_TOT  SUB_TOT (H1a) 0.34 0.087 0.0001 Accepted 
DEM_DESCR  SUB_TOT 
(H2a) 
0.37 0.042 0.63 Not Accepted 
TERR_DESCR SUB_TOT 
(H3a) 
0.30 -0.10 0.0001 Accepted 
PART_TOT  SUB_TOT (H4a) 0.55 0.032 0.602 Not Accepted 
FOR_TOT  SYM_TOT (H1b) 0.23 -0.048 0.62 Not Accepted 
DEM_DESCR  SYM_TOT 
(H2b) 
0.26 0.188 0.011 Accepted 
TERR_DESCR SYM_TOT 
(H3b) 
0.519 0.49 0.0001 Accepted 

















INFL_PUBLIC + (***) + (***) + (**) 








+ (***) + (***) 
PART_TOT  SYM_TOT 
(H4b) 








INFL_TRADE - (***) - (***) - (***) 
INFL_CIVIL - (**) + (***) + (***) 




















Figure 3. Significant moderation effects on the regressions. 
